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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper addresses the democratic origins of auditing of the public sector and aim at developing a 
concept of “Good Auditing” based on democratic theories. The paper argues that the normative 
characteristics of auditing found in the literature, such as independence and professionalism, are 
well founded in democracy theory. The unclearness of the role and responsibility of auditors is 
argued to be a consequence of both uncertainty of the main principle and how the accountability 
process of auditing should be arranged, as well as changes in the professions attitude towards the 
scope of the audit objectives. From a democratic perspective there is need for auditors to recognize 
the citizens as the principle, which implies fulfilling the people’s expectations of their role as well as 
aiming at limiting mismanagement of the public sector. This requires a higher ambition than merely 
report to the administrative management and elected politicians. “Good Auditing” is defined the 
following way:  Good auditing of the public sector is distinguished by recognizing the people as the principal, inde-
pendence to the auditee and professionalism in the exercise of the audit practice.  
 
 
 
   
Maria Gustavsson 
The Quality of Government Institute 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
Maria.gustavsson@gu.se 
 3 
Democracy Theory and Controlling the Power of Bureaucracy 
In research and politics an increased interest in audit, inspections and oversight of the public sector 
is noted by many scholars (Dye & Staphenhurst 1998; Gendron et al. 2007; Guénin-Paracini & 
Gendron 2010; Hood et al. 1999; Kelly 2003; Pentland 2000; Power 1999; Rose-Ackerman 2005; 
Skaerbaek 2009). This increase is not merely driven by efficiency considerations but also by confi-
dence that external audit of the public sector contributes to the overall legitimacy of the democratic 
society. Despite the trust we have in audit as a mechanism of democratic accountability and the 
increased audit activities observed in society, there is today a lack of theoretically developed con-
cepts of what may constitute “Good Auditing” of the public sector. This can be compared with 
extensive discussions on concepts such as good governance, quality of government as well as on 
democracy itself.  
A large literature on accountability however exists, in which elaborated discussion on the wide 
range of mechanisms of accountability in the public sector is held (c.f. Behn 2001; Bovens 2005; 
Day and Klein 1978; Hanberger 2009; Mulgan 2000; 2003; Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Sinclair 
1995). Yet these discussions are generally held separate from democracy theory and do not seek to 
develop any normative framework for how a mechanism of holding the bureaucracy to account 
best should be organized, to serve its democratic purposes.  
In turn, within democracy theory, little attention has been paid to how accountability of the public 
sector should be organized (c.f. Prezeworski et al 1999; Fukuyama 2011). Rather focus has been on 
how the general will may be realized through competitive elections (Shapiro 2003), inclusion (Men-
dus 1992; Phillips 1991), voter and elite behavior (Dahl 2000; Lively 1975), and the necessity of 
political rights (Hadenius 1992). Although Dahl (2000) recognizes how the people delegates their 
power indirectly to large groups of public officials and that these officials constitute a powerful 
elite, yet in designing necessary criteria for a democracy he does not include a democratic control of 
the bureaucracy. Instead, he focuses on the importance of holding political leaders to account. (p. 
125).  Even though the control of the public sector has been neglected in political theory, there are 
exceptions; Aristotle, John Stuart Mill and Max Weber emphasize the importance of a function 
such as audit to reassure that the power of the public administration will not be too extensive as 
well as they highlight various aspects to constitute its character.  
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To seek the theoretical foundations for a mechanism like auditing is significant; several normative 
aspects of auditing are highlighted in the literature, while other parts of its role and responsibility 
are much vaguer. Auditors have been criticized to not fulfill their responsibilities, in particular in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis their position has been heavily questioned (Sikka 2009), and the 
gap of expectations between what the auditing profession considers their responsibility and what 
the general public expects of them is a well-known theme in the auditing literature. To be able to 
continue a discussion of the role of auditing in the democratic society, there is thus a need to con-
nect the discussion to the history of political theory and the democratic foundations of auditing (c.f. 
Dunn 1996). The aim of this paper is to seek the theoretical roots of understanding audit as a part 
of democratic accountability, and second, on the basis of this analysis, the aim is to outline a nor-
mative concept of how “Good Auditing” can be defined and organized in the democratic society. 
 
Democratic Accountability in Athens 
The Athenians held their democratic system sacred and created several procedures to limit the 
possibilities of exceeding the power given in political and administrative positions. In particular, 
there seem to have been a particular concern with how public officials fulfilled their obligations at 
office as there was, as Todd (1993) describes it, “an astonishing wide range and frequency in our 
sources of penal procedures brought against public officials” (p. 301). Several different procedures 
for holding public officials accountable existed in parallel in Athens, where some were more pro-
minent and politically important during some periods of time than others (Todd 1993 p. 113). 
Beyond discussing the ideas advanced by Aristotle, the paper also provide a general picture of the 
various processes for holding officials to account in the early democratic state of Athens during the 
fifth and fourth century B C. 
In book VI in The Politics, Aristotle reviews which public offices are necessary within the democratic 
state and at the end of this enumeration he states that: 
 
But since some, not to say all, of these offices handle the public money, there must 
of necessity be another office which examines and audits them, and has no other 
function. Such officers are called by various names – Scrutineers, Auditors, Ac-
countants, Controllers.  
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(Aristotle, The Politics, Book VI, 1322b5-15) 
He continues in the Constitution of Athens to declare that these auditors were in number ten and 
were selected by lot by the Boule (the Council) among its members (Aristotle, The Constitution of 
Athens, XLVIII 3)1. This procedure directed specifically towards public officials was called euhtunai 
and it was a process where public officials had to present their accounts (logoi) at the end of their 
office term. The first stage in euthunai was directed towards public officials who have handled the 
public money. This process was led by auditors (logistai) assisted by public advocates (sunêgoroi). If 
mismanagement of the public funds was found, the euthunai process could be continued in court, 
where public advocates were used as prosecutors and the process was led by auditors. The first 
stage of euthunai was an examination of the officials’ financial records and it intended to discover 
corruption and embezzlement among the officials (Todd 1993, p. 112-113) If the auditors found 
any embezzlement or bribe-taking the jury could sentence the official to pay a fine of ten times the 
amount the official had received or stolen (Aristotle, The Constitution of Athens, LVI 2). If no pro-
blems with the accounts were found by the auditors, the general public was invited to make charges 
against the public official regarding the financial management of the officials in the second stage of 
euthunai (Euben 1997, p. 96, Elster p. 267).  
The second stage of euthunai examined any other kind of misconduct in public office. This process 
was not handled by auditors but by other particular officials (euthunoi), who accepted accusations 
made against the officials whose accounts had been audited from anyone in the general public. 
Allegations in this process commonly concerned misuse of power or having neglected duties. If the 
euthonoi found the charges made credible, the case was handed over to a court (Euben 1997, p. 96-
97). Similar to the auditors, the particular officials handling this second stage of euthunai as well as 
their assistants were selected by lot by the Boule and consisted of one member from each tribe 
(Aristotle, The Constitution of Athens, XLVIII 4).  
As Todd (1993) argues, the well-developed procedures in two stages with different investigators, 
where a specific process examined particularly how the public funds had been handled, indicates 
that the Athenian democracy considered the work of the public administration and particularly the 
financial side of it to be of substantial significance for their democratic society (p. 302). Public offi-
                                                     
1 The body which handled the everyday life in Athens, it consisted of 500 members, 50 from each tribe who were se-
lected by lot also called the Council or the Council of Five Hundred. In this paper the Boule will be called the Council 
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cials were not allowed to exercise several rights such as traveling and transferring property, until the 
process of euthunai was finished and they were acquitted of all charges (Euben 1997, p. 97).  
Euthunai appears to have been an important procedure of creating democratic accountability par-
ticularly in the fifth century in Athens, while in the fourth the eisangelia became more popular, pro-
bably due to the fact that this process was not restricted to the end of the officials term, but could 
be used at any time of the year (Todd 1993, p. 113, p. 302). Hansen (1975) however claims that we 
cannot be sure of how the euthunai process looked like in the fifth century, and that his descript-
ions of the process apply only to euthunai in the fourth century (p. 45). Unlike euthunai where a 
case resulted in a court trial, in the eisangelia process the cases were brought to the Ekklesia (the 
Assembly) and the Council (Hansen 1975, p. 9).   
The different processes were chosen not only depending on which allegations were made, the 
prosecutor had large possibilities to select which of the processes to use. Different penalties for the 
same crime could be the result of the selection of process. For instance, as Hansen (1975) points 
out, if a case of corruption was processed in an eisangelia the consequence could be death penalty, 
while in a euthunai the penalty for the same crime could be a large fine (p. 9). It appears to be dif-
ficult to sometimes distinguish between processes of eisangelia and the process in the second stage 
in euthunai, as there are examples of the same trials described as both eisangelia and euthunai, 
which dealt with treason and bribes, Hansen (1975) however argues that this could be a result of 
euthunai being a general term for holding someone accountable (p. 45). A possible way to distin-
guish which process was used would be to see if the process was held by the end of the officials’ 
term at office, by the end of the year. The audit process at the first stage of euthunai was however 
easier to distinguish from the eisangelia as the officials could merely be charged with embezzle-
ment, corruption or misconduct at office and not with treason and overthrow of democracy, as 
they could in the second stage of euthunai and in the eisangelia, (Hansen 1975, p. 45-47).2  
Although the eisangelia primarily was directed towards public officials, due to a specific clause also 
ordinary citizens could in this process be charged with overthrow of democracy (Todd 1993, p. 
114). Similar to euthunai, cases in eisangelia could be brought to court, if the cases were judged as 
serious by the Council where they first were presented. The most common procedure was however 
                                                     
2 The Ekklesia was the general Assembly. The Council of Five Hundred is another name on the Boule, which in this 
paper is called the Council 
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that the Council presented the charges directly to the Assembly, and the Assembly decided if the 
case should be brought to court of if it should be processed in a juridical sitting in the Assembly 
itself (Todd 1993, p. 114).   
As auditors and other examiners of the conduct of public officials were members of the Council 
selected by lot, the Council became the main investigator of the public positions (Aristotle, The 
Constitution of Athens, XLV 2). Yet, the Council themselves were not left unexamined. The Assembly 
met for a plenary session each Prytany (every tenth of the year) to vote on whether the performance 
of these office-holders were satisfactory or not (XLIII 4).  
The third procedure existing in Athens to create democratic accountability directed specifically 
towards the tenure of public office was apophasis which was introduced in 350 BC. The investigat-
ions and charges made within an apophasis concerned similar issues as the euthunai and eisangelia, 
for instance charges of treason, bribes and attempts to overthrow democracy. In different from the 
above processes apophasis was a procedure where the Areopagos (the Aristocratic Council) of 
Athens undertook the investigation and not the Council of Five Hundred. The Aristocratic Council 
wrote a particular apophasis reports including also decisions of whether the officials were guilty of 
the allegations or not. The investigation did however proceed in a court trial where the decision of 
the Aristocratic Council could be changed (Hansen 1975, p. 39- 40; Todd 1993, p. 115). Despite all 
these various procedure to control public officials and the financial administration, the public fi-
nancial situation in Athens is described as being chaotic and ordinary citizens in Athens not to been 
likely to have understood the accounts and figures presented to them (Todd 1993, p. 303-304).3  
It has become an established idea that our contemporary world has turned into an “Audit Society” 
where audits and inspections of various kinds have increased largely in scope and significance (c.f. 
Power 1999). Considering the situation in Athens, this does not seem to be a new phenomenon 
however. Rather it appears to be a deeply rooted concern in a democratic society to limit the possi-
bilities to exceed power in public positions, which just has been reshaped to suit our modern soci-
ety and modern techniques. Or, to put it in the words of Aristotle: “For the people do not take any 
                                                     
3 Aristotle is however not entirely consistent with these democratic ideals on the behalf of meritocracy , which will be 
further discussed in the following section on professionalism Some exceptions were made, Aristotle lists the public 
positions where he thinks that elections could be beneficiary, those were for instance generals and high financial posi-
tions. 
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great offence at being kept out of the government  … but what irritates them is to think that their 
rulers are stealing the public money” (Aristotle, The Politics, Book V 1308b34-38). 
 
Independence 
As we see in above review of processes holding public officials to account in the early Athenian 
democracy and in Aristotle’s works, the normative idea of auditors holding an independent position 
from the auditee, which still is argued to be core fundament in contemporary literature on audit and 
accountability (Flint 1988; Mautz & Sharaf 1961; Normanton 1966; Power 1999; 2005; 
Hollingsworth & White 999) was then already established. As Aristotle claims in the first quotation 
above, he regarded is as necessary that the officials who handled the public money were reviewed 
by other officials who were separated from them, and had no other assignments (Aristotle, The 
Politics, Book VI, 1322b5-15). To be independent constitute auditors possibility of fulfilling the role 
of an external examiner. Without such independence the administration could present their 
accounts and evaluate their work, with the immediate risk of merely serving their own interest 
(Wildavsky 1979).  
Yet, independence contains several dimensions and the manner by which independent auditing 
should be understood has been debated in the literature. Sikka and Willmott (1995a) argue that 
independence is not merely about actual independence, the justification of auditors’ work is depen-
dent on how their independence is perceived by others, such as politicians, journalist and the gene-
ral public. If they are too closely connected to the audited organization their position to serve the 
public interest and hold that organization to account may be challenged. Bartlett (1993) demonstra-
tes how perceptions of audit independence are not dichotomous but operate on a continuum. The 
perceptions varied depending on how involved the auditors were in the clients beyond auditing 
their accounts, where participation in a joint venture with the client was regarded as representing a 
very low degree of independence. Responses from the audit profession on criticism of insufficient 
independence have been to strengthen ethical guidelines and strengthen the disciplinary arrange-
ment. Hence the question of independence has been made into a question of integrity of the indi-
vidual auditor, while larger reforms to change the institutional relationships between the auditors 
and the auditees have been absent (Sikka and Willmott 1995a). Thus a distinction between indi-
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vidual and institutional level can be distinguished, is auditing independence a question of moral 
virtue and ethics among auditors (Antle 1984; Bayou, Reinstein & Williams 2011; Gendron, Cooper 
& Townley 2000; Preston et al. 1995) or does it rather concern the auditors structural position to 
the auditee (Sikka & Willmott 1995b; Cullinan & Sutton 2002)?   
Although Aristotle holds elaborated discussions of ethics in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian 
Ethics, there are few such discussions in the Politics or in the Constitution of Athens. A passage in the 
Politics illustrates his intentions that these ethical considerations should be valid also in the charac-
teristics of the political life and in organizing the democratic state. “And the same principles of 
excellence and badness are characteristics of cities and of constitutions; for the constitution is so to 
speak the life of the city” (The Politics, Book IV 1295a 39-41). There are however less specific ideas 
as regarding how individual ethics and integrity of auditors, or the other specific scrutinizers re-
viewing the work of the public administration, should be obtained, or how institutional arrange-
ments should be designed to guarantee an independent review of the bureaucracy, apart from the 
statement that auditors should be in a separate office from the officials they audit (Aristotle, The 
Politics, Book VI, 1322b5-15).  
The auditors and the other examiners of public work in Athens were selected by lot the Council 
among its members and members of the Council were in turn also selected by lot. Thus it appears 
unlikely that would have been a discussion of choosing specific persons with certain skills or with 
high integrity and moral standards to conduct this work. In particular since election to positions 
instead of selection by lot was regarded by Aristotle as a sign of elitism and not as an entirely de-
mocratic procedure (Todd 1993, p. 292).   Additionally, in most of the processes holding public 
officials to account the general public was given large possibilities to make charges, which does not 
indicate that ethics and moral virtue of those who reviewed officials was a central issue, rather it 
illustrates extended democratic ideals of how examination of public office was regarded as a con-
cern for all citizens.   
The question of auditors’ ethical standards and moral virtue and its importance for legitimizing the 
audit work was however emphasized by Mill in Considerations on Representative Government ((1861) 
2001). Although he holds a general discussion stating that a first component of good government is 
virtue and intelligence among the general public (p. 24) he later specifically argue that this virtue is 
of significance for the ones reviewing the conduct of the administration: 
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But political checks will no more act of themselves than a bridle will direct a horse 
without a rider. If the checking functionaries are as corrupt or negligent as those 
whom they ought to check … little benefit will be derived from the best administra-
tive apparatus  
(Mill, John Stuart (1861) 2001, p. 24) 
 
Similar to Aristotle, Mill clarifies in his discussions the need to create systems of control of the 
administration and that it was necessary to separate “these offices of control and criticism” from 
the administration whose work they were to examine (p. 70). In addition, he states that these offices 
of control and criticism should be subordinated the parliament. In different to Aristotle and the 
organization of the democratic society in Athens, Mill made a distinction between the democratic 
institutions and the administration, where the latter constituted the representative bodies which 
were to be separated from the administration and justice and he regarded political interferences in 
the administration as harmful (Urbinati 2002).  
It is difficult to clarify whether the institutional design in Athens entailed an independent review of 
the public positions. Beyond the procedure of the lot to decide upon public appointments, there 
was in Athens also a system of rotation, which meant that a person could not hold the same office 
more than once and as the general period of holding office was for one year, the rotation on the 
public positions must have been extensive (Todd 1993). Thus although the auditors did not share 
the same office as those they were appointed to review, the vast system of rotating public positions 
indicates a likelihood of reviewing each other in turns. In particular as all public positions, including 
auditors, were selected by lot among the members of the Council there was a fairly limited number 
of people being possible to appoint to the various positions.  
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Hence, the Council, which was the institution that governed the everyday life in Athens which may 
be regarded as the institution responsible for the review of its own officials conduct, cannot be 
regarded as particularity independent in these processes. Although processes in eisangelia to a large 
extent were handled by the Assembly, they were still processed by the Council at the first stage 
before allegations were presented to the Assembly, or the court. It should be added in this context 
that the Athenian system of justice was heavily politicized and they did not share the view of sepa-
ration of power as a fundamental part of democracy (Todd 1993), rather involvement by all citizens 
in all parts of the political life were regarded as the fundaments of democracy (c.f. Aristotle the Po-
litics Book V 1309a 2 and Book VI 1317a40-b1-2), which may explain also the lack of independent 
administrative scrutiny. 
 
Professionalism 
Although the Athenian system operated on amateur basis, (Todd 1993), the auditing guild has in 
our contemporary society developed into a proper profession (see for instance Bédard 1989; Mautz 
& Sharaf 1961). In Anglo-Saxon countries the process of professionalize auditors is argued to have 
taken place during the late 19 century, while in other countries such as Greece and Belgium au-
diting became a proper profession first in the 1940s and 1950s (Ballas 1998; De Beelde 2002). A 
profession according to Abbott (1988) is distinguished by a claim for abstract knowledge and appli-
cation of such knowledge to particular cases (p. 8). Professional groups aim to control the know-
ledge and skill within the profession and in doing so they exercise authority over techniques and 
over the abstract knowledge in the area (Abbott 1988). Professional authority and control can be 
exercised in several ways, for instance through regulating the entrance to the profession through 
demands for specific education and particular professional exams controlled by the profession, but 
also by internal regulation such as professional standards and ethical codes of conduct (Bédard 
1989; Preston et al. 1995). The auditing profession is recognized to have increased their number of 
standards and guidelines for their members significantly, and this is argued to be a reaction from 
the profession on external pressures questioning their legitimacy (Byington, Sutter & Munter 1990; 
Power 2003). The development of the audit professionalization to increase standardization of pro-
cedures is demonstrated by Preston et al. (1995) when they study the changes in the profession’s 
code of conduct. They argue that the profession’s concerns of ethics has been a significant part in 
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legitimizing their work, but the focus of ethical conduct has changed over time from emphasizing 
values such as “virtues of courage”, “integrity”, and “the professional state of mind” to “what rules 
the members ought to follow” and “what standards ought to be set and adhere to” (Preston et al. 
1995, p. 536). The auditing profession has also been criticized for focusing too closely on following 
the proper procedures and not considers what may be in the stakeholders’ interest to examine and 
report upon (Öhman et al. 2006). These changes and the criticism could be a consequence of the 
more disciplinary side of the profession, as decisions in court on whether auditors should be char-
ged with professional negligence or not are primarily based on the extent to which auditors have 
followed the professional standards (Byington, Sutton & Munter 1990).  
The conditions of professionalization are not merely determined by the profession; the state consti-
tutes an important part in the process as there is a need for the profession to be recognized by the 
state as well as the state may use the profession to serve its own interest, such as demonstrating 
economic and political control, and create legitimacy for its actions (Ballas 1998). However, upon a 
closer examination, the relationship between professionalization, in the sense of selecting public 
official based on merits, and democracy appear as somewhat ambiguous.  
 Todd (1993) argues that:  “The most important underlying characteristics of Athenian democracy 
is that it was and remained an amateur system” (p. 291). These characteristics are demonstrated in 
the manner by which public officials were selected by lot and not by merit and how they were not 
allowed to hold the same office for more than one term, which generally was one year. Due to its 
size, exception from reappointment was made for the Council, but it was restricted to a maximum 
of two terms, and the Council members were not allowed to serve two consecutive terms in office. 
Elections were regarded as supporting an elite system, as it generally favors persons who are well 
acknowledged in the community. Exceptions were made for military officials and high financial 
officials who were elected, military officials without any restrictions in terms and financial officials 
from the mid-fourth century with extended terms. The latter is argued to indicate a change from a 
full democratic system to a system which focused more on efficiency (Todd 1993, p. 292, 292n). 
Athens shift from full democratic system towards allowing more efficiency and merit-based posit-
ions in which certain public positions were entrusted substantial power is thoroughly described by 
Rhodes (1980). In the fifth century in Athens the state finances were centrally controlled by the 
Assembly, who had to approve all expenditures, a procedure which changed in the fourth century 
when separated funds for separate purposes were created. Although the new system entailed more 
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advanced financial procedures, in which the Assembly did no longer need to authorize all financial 
transactions, a disadvantage with the more fragmented system instead became the difficulties to 
attain a proper picture of the overall financial situation in the city. A fragmentation which was 
strengthened by the prevailing strong democratic principles, where citizens rotated on all public 
position and were only allowed to hold them for a limited amount of time (Rhodes 1980, p. 309-
311). Due to poor finances a need to use and control resources more efficiently emerged in Athens 
in the mid fourth-century, which led to gradual steps away from the democratic principles in the 
administration of the city. The single financial official who was elected, and could be re-elected, to 
manage the theroic funds4  was given expanded assignments and became involved in activities in 
the rest of the state administration, an area previously controlled only by the Council, and through 
this position the single public official became highly powerful (Rhodes 1980). The arrangement led 
to economic success in Athens, but as Rhodes (1980) argues it was “one in direct conflict with the 
democratic principles of democratic administration evolved in the fifth century” (p. 313). Despite 
this shift from a full democratic system to focusing more efficiency in the administration, the main 
part of the public duties was still carried out by amateurs selected by lot on a rotation basis (Rhodes 
1980).  
The ambiguity, between professionalism and efficiency on the one hand and democracy on the 
other, is also discussed by Aristotle in the Politics. In his comparative discussions on Sparta, Cartago 
and Crete he argues that many of the Carthaginian institutions are excellent and claims that an im-
provement in Cartago is that their magistrates are elected according to merit, and not by chance as 
the leaders of Sparta (Aristotle the Politics Book II, 1272b 35-37). He does however classify election 
according to merit as aristocracy and not democracy: “If, then, election of magistrates for their 
wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy” (Aristotle the Politics 
Book II, 1273a 26-27). Aristotle’s position was that genuine democratic systems involved possibili-
ties for all citizens to hold public office and in large states these positions should be divided among 
many people. This statement is yet followed by another, somewhat contradictory to the principles 
of rotation and sortation practiced in Athens and more in favor of professionalism among public 
officials: “this arrangement is fairer to all, and any action familiarized by repetition is better and 
sooner performed” (Aristotle the Politics Book II, 1273b 15). This argument favoring the rule by 
                                                     
4 Theroic funds were financial funds which aimed at covering citizens’ theatre tickets and major festivals. 
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excellence and merit is elaborated further in Book III, in which Aristotle argues that rulers need to 
be both good and wise, while citizens merely need to be good (Book III, 1277a15-16) and conclu-
des by arguing that the best form of government is the government which is administered by the 
best and: “in which there is one man, or a whole family, or many persons, excelling all the others 
together in excellence, and both rulers and subjects are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be ru-
led, in such a manner as to attain the most desirable life” (III, 1288a34-37). This more elitist view is 
nuanced and elaborated in other parts of the Politics, for instance in Book IV in which he refers to 
the Ethics and states that excellence is a mean which should be attainable by everyone and the excel-
lence of the city should follow the same principles (1295a35-41).  
In a similar vein, Weber ((1922) 1978) discusses the conflict between democracy and a professional 
specialized administration. He argues that there is a necessity of having special education and par-
ticular exams for the public officials and that it is unavoidable that the bureaucracy becomes more 
specialized. However when he elaborates on its characteristics and its implication he does not re-
gard it as all advantageous and claims that the reasons behind this special educations and exams are 
not “a sudden awakened ‘thirst for education’ but the desire for restricting the supply for these 
positions and their monopolization by the owners of educational certificates” (p. 241, c.f. Abbott 
1988). In particular Weber ((1922) 1978) argued that the special examination and the merit system 
was in conflict with democratic principles:  “On the other hand ‘democracy’ fears that a merit sy-
stem and educational certificates will result in a privileged ‘caste’ Hence, democracy fights against 
the special-examination system.” (p. 240). Consequently, Weber ((1922) 1978) claims that it would 
be in the democratic interests to promote “universal accessibility of office” and expand the “the 
sphere of influence of ‘public opinion’ as far as practicable” into the administration, to reduce its 
authority (p. 226). Otherwise there was a risk that the administration developed into a too closed 
group of experts. Since Weber ((1922) 1978) saw a risk in the administration becoming too power-
ful as it became more specialized and filled with experts, universal accessibility to office and public 
influence into the administration he also discussed other measures to limits its authority. He argued 
that public officials needed to be controlled and that such control would likely be more effective if 
experts were used to control other experts, since leaders generally lacked the kind of knowledge 
needed to be able to control the experts’ work. (p. 236). In addition he argued that there should be 
possibility to criticize the officials in public, yet in a manner sensible to the officials “honor” (p. 
208).  
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If Aristotle and Weber saw conflicts between democracy and professionalism, Mill considered de-
politicization of the bureaucracy as a necessary way forward for democracies. Even if he considered 
a growing bureaucracy a thereat towards democracy, he still argued that there was a need to sepa-
rate the political bodies and the administration and that the administration needed skilled persons 
working there who carried out their duties in an impersonal manner according to specific procedu-
res (Urbinati 2002, p. 54-55). Mill made a distinction between politics and policy-making and regar-
ded it as important to keep political preferences away from those who carried out he politics in 
practice, to him this was “a crucial step toward democratization” (Urbinati 2002, p. 55).  
 
Accountability Relationships, Audit Assignment and “Good Au-
diting” 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, auditors have been criticized for not acting in stakeholder’s, such 
as the public, interest and not being concerned about whether the society hold other expectations 
of them than what they consider their assignment. In addition, the critique have pointed out that 
auditors closeness to the top management as well as the fees they charge are reasons for why they 
have not been able to, or willing to, detect and alert stakeholders on problems in the audited enti-
ties (Cullinan and Sutton 2002; Sikka 2009). Partly this may be explained by the development of a 
strong profession which to a high extent is self-regulated, but it may also be explained by an actual 
uncertainty of how the relationship to their principle should be arranged and what may be expected 
of them in terms of detecting corruption, mismanagement and fraud.   
According to democratic ideals, in audit of public sector entities the citizens may naturally be regar-
ded as the main principle towards which the audit should direct its findings and deliver its reports. 
Although it may have been fairly easy to manage in a small scale democracy such as Athens where 
the people directly could confront the public officials in various procedures, the relationship 
between the citizens and the audit becomes more complicated in large scale modern democracies.   
Some categorize auditing to serve primarily as a function within the framework of legal accounta-
bility, wherein a high degree of external control of the compliance of laws and regulations exists 
and the auditors have possibilities to demand sanctions (Bundt 2000; c.f. Romzek & Dubnicks 
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1987). In the countries using this juridical audit system (for instance France and the Netherlands) 
the national audit offices serve as courts wherein the public entities may be charged with penalties, 
if auditors detect irregularities. In such arrangement the auditors acquire large discretion and 
become final judges of the performance of the administration, without any participation from the 
citizens.  
In other countries such as Sweden and Great Britain auditing builds on recommendation to elected 
politicians and administrative management, which then are responsible for managing the recom-
mendations from the auditors (Pollitt and Summa 1997). As auditors lack possibilities to sanction 
the auditee and the audit process to a great extent builds on communication with management 
external audit can also in the main be considered an instrument for the political leaders to evaluate 
the performance of the bureaucracy (Hollingsworth et al. 1998; Sinclair 1995). In such an 
accountability arrangement it mainly becomes the responsibility of the political leaders and the 
administrative management to act on the basis of the results from the audit, on behalf of the citi-
zens. Andersson and Bergman (2009) demonstrate in their study that the significance management 
attaches to audits can have critical consequences for the opportunity to detect maladministration in 
the public administration. Weak audits and limited attention to the audit reports constituted partly 
the explanation for why two otherwise seemingly similar regions in Sweden experienced different 
levels of corruption (Andersson and Bergman 2009).  
Accountability may also be realized through openness and access to information (Dunn 2003; Mul-
gan 2000; Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Sinclair 1995), wherein the mere access to information of 
public sector performance result in democratic control of the administration. Particularly, informat-
ion produced by an independent auditing body may contribute to the trust in the administration 
(Ahlbäck 1999; James 2010). Ferraz and Finan (2008) illustrate in their study the manner by which 
audit reports significantly may impact on how citizens hold political leaders to account in elections. 
As part of the anti-corruption strategies, the Brazilian state started an extended audit of randomly 
selected municipalities in 2003. The results from the audit were published on the internet and han-
ded over to the local media. The audit reports on the prevalence of corruption in some municipali-
ties turned out to largely impact on whether the local politicians were reelected or not. Politicians 
who were reported as corrupted by the audit were to a much lesser extent reelected and vice versa; 
politicians reported on as “clean” in the audits had a much higher chance to be reelected (Ferraz 
and Finan 2008). In a similar vein, James (2010) argues that citizens to a large extent are affected by 
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the information on public sector performance generated by external audit agencies. In his study, the 
expectations and the satisfaction rose among the citizens in cases where the audit information sho-
wed a well performing administration, as well as the opposite was demonstrated; in cases where the 
audit information generated negative reviews of the performance, the levels of satisfaction declined. 
Yet, is may be questioned whether the information produced by auditors are accessible and used by 
the citizens, and if media, as a mediator through which the relationship between the citizen and the 
audits is managed, always is beneficial.  
Hanberger (2009) argues that the direct contact between auditors and citizens rarely works, few 
citizens have knowledge of audit reports and the reports are experienced as linguistically in-
accessible. On the other hand, Hanberger (2009) finds that political decision makers attach great 
importance to audits, although auditors emphasized that their recommendations were not followed 
to any great extent (p. 12-13). To inform the citizens through the use of media is however not un-
controversial among auditors. In general, auditors regard their assignment as based on a dialogue 
with the administrative management and the political leadership, and public criticism may ruin such 
relationships. The Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO) does however not follow this more 
careful attitude. Bringselius (forthcoming) argues that the SNAO aims at maximizing their reports’ 
impact in media, as they desire to increase the legitimacy for their existence. The consequences 
pointed out can however be that negative aspects are specifically searched for and sometimes exag-
gerated in the reporting, in order to attain attention in the media. Such strategy is argued to harm 
not only the audited entities but also make the national audit office become “partner with the me-
dia” instead of an independent examiner of the public administration (Bringselius forthcoming).  
Although a juridical process was used when the auditors found corruption and fraud in Athens, the 
system advocated by Aristotle was however that all citizens hold office on a rotation basis, thus the 
courts were amateur courts filled with ordinary citizens: “that all men should sit in judgment, or 
that judges selected out of all should judge” (The Politics 1317b25-26). This is very different from 
the contemporary system used in many countries, in which auditors become specialized and act as 
judges in a court. There are likely little chances for ordinary citizens to easily access such positions 
in society.  In addition, in Athens, if the auditors did not find any mismanagement, the public had 
every opportunity to accuse the public officials for mismanagement, corruption or fraud. Hence the 
general public played a significant role in the audit processes, not only in terms of the financial 
management but also the review of the performance in general. From primarily have used the court 
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in the audit processes, the Assembly eventually gained a more prominent role in these procedures. 
In the fourth century, it was commonly the Assembly which decided on whether these processes 
should be taken to court or be processed in a juridical sitting in the Assembly. Aristotle also states 
when defining the characteristics of a democracy that the Assembly should be supreme over all 
causes, or at least the most important causes such as the constitution, private contracts and the 
scrutiny of the accounts. The officials on the other hand, should not be supreme over any, or only 
over a few (The Politics 1317b25-30).  
In modern democracies elected politicians generally serve as representatives for the people, and 
holding officials to account for their performance and financial management in front of all citizens 
appear not as a desirable scenario. However, the link between the citizens and the audit through 
elected representatives and administrative management do not always appear to work as intended. 
It has been demonstrated that auditors sometimes are too aligned with the management to actually 
report sufficiently on maladministration, or when they report, auditors’ experience that their reports 
are not paid attention to, and the use of media in some cases become a way of trying to draw at-
tention to their findings. In addition, the divergent manners by which audits are handled by the 
administrative and political leadership have contributed to explanations of differences in levels of 
corruption. Thus, the question which unfolds is if this arrangement serves its democratic purposes 
sufficiently. If auditing should regard citizens as the main principle towards which the public admi-
nistration should be accountable, the responsibility for calling attention to maladministration in a 
manner which aim at limiting mismanagement as well as improving its assignment in the public’s 
interests must be the auditors. Consequently, in contrast to Bringselius (forthcoming) I argue that 
there is need for auditors to use the appropriate measures to able to fulfill its democratic purposes, 
which includes using media to call attention to their findings when they find such methods ne-
cessary. Public criticism, but with respect for the officials’ honor, was also argued by Weber ((1922) 
1978) to be essential in order to limit the powers of the bureaucracy (p. 208).  
Another aspect related to the gap of expectations between stakeholders and what the auditing pro-
fession consider being a part of their assignment is whether auditors should detect embezzlement, 
fraud and corruption (c.f. Larsson 2005). Power (1999) argues that it has long been debated among 
scholars if detection of such malpractices should be a part of auditing, but the debate come to a 
general agreement that it was not to be within the audit objectives, in the 1940s, even if this might 
have been a purpose when auditing was established (c.f. Hood xxxx). The character of auditing has 
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changed, most likely as a consequence of an internal professional transformation. Yet, the general 
public still believes and expects that such malpractices should be detected by auditors, even if the 
auditing profession argues that this is a misunderstanding from the public side regarding the role 
and responsibility of auditors (Power 1999, p. 21-22). 
Turning to the to the democratic origins of auditing it becomes obvious how the establishment of 
auditing is argued to mainly be a matter of detecting mismanagement, embezzlement, fraud and 
corruption. When Aristotle discusses the necessity and function of auditors in the democratic state 
the examples he gives of what kind of issued the auditor may come to handle he makes the 
following statement:  
 
If they detect anyone who has been guilty of embezzlement, the jury condemns him for 
theft of the public money, and he is sentenced to pay ten times the amount stolen; if they 
demonstrate that anyone has taken bribes and the jury convicts him, they assess the size 
of the bribe, and again he pays ten times this amount. If they condemn him for maladmi-
nistration, they assess the amount, and this is what he pays… 
(Aristotle, The Constitution of Athens XLIX  LIV2) 
Although assignments need to change when society is modernized and the audited entities becomes 
more complex, it yet appears as if the auditing profession has altered their role and responsibility to 
the degree that its democratic purposes have been lost. If they are no to discover and prevent mis-
management, fraud and corruption in the public administration, then who are? As discussed 
previously, there a need for auditors to recognize the citizens as their main principle. Instead of 
explaining to the general public how it has misunderstood auditors’ responsibilities, perhaps it is 
time that the auditing profession better fulfill the societies’ expectations on its role, in the de-
mocracy.  Finally, what then may be defined as “Good Auditing” from a democratic perspective? 
This paper has argued that the normative characteristics of auditing found in the literature, such as 
independence and professionalism, are well founded in democracy theory. Even if the latter have 
been debated, the development of political theory indicates that as the public sector becomes more 
professionalized, there is a need for experts to control experts in the public administration (c.f. 
Weber (1922) 1978), or else there is a risk that auditors fall into the same asymmetric relationship to 
the bureaucracy as politicians, which means that they would be disadvantaged against those they 
control. Furthermore, the unclearness of the role and responsibility of auditors have been argued to 
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be a consequence of both uncertainty of the main principle and how the accountability process of 
auditing should be arranged, as well as changes in the professions attitude towards what they consi-
der is within the scope of the audit objectives. This paper has argued that from a democratic per-
spective there is need for auditors to recognize the citizens as the principle, which implies fulfilling 
the people’s expectations of their role as well as aiming at limiting mismanagement of the public 
sector. This requires a higher ambition than merely report to the administrative management and 
elected politicians. Auditors should seek to bring attention to their audit findings, in cases when it 
can lead to improvement in the administration, using mediators such as the media when they 
consider it necessary.  Hence, “Good Auditing” can be defined the following way: Good auditing of 
the public sector is distinguished by recognizing the people as the principal, independence to the auditee and profession-
alism in the exercise of the audit practice. 
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